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Abstract 
 
Security challenges require greater insight and 
flexibility into the way deception can be identified and 
responded to. Deception research in interactions has 
identified behaviors indicative of truth-telling and 
deceit. Deception in military environments has focused 
on planning deception, where approaches have been 
developed to deceive others, but neglecting counter-
deception perspectives. To address these challenges a 
holistic approach to deception is advocated. A 
literature review of deception was conducted followed 
by validation interviews with Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs). Explanatory thematic analysis of interviews 
conducted with SMEs (n=19) led to the development of 
meta-themes related to the ‘deceiver’, their ‘intent; 
‘strategies and tactics’ of deception, ‘interpretation’ by 
the target and ‘target’ decision-making strengths and 
vulnerabilities. This led to the development of the 
Holistic Model of Deception (HMD), an approach 
where strategies reflect context. The implications of 
this approach are considered alongside the limitations 
and future directions required to validate the HMD. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The current paper defines deception as “a 
deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in 
another a belief which the communicator considers to 
be untrue, with the aim of influencing the receivers’ 
mindset (manner of thinking structured by their 
attitudes, personality and culture) and/or behavior”. 
This definition is applicable across interpersonal and 
mediated environments, whether the act is verbal, non-
verbal or physical, and emphasizes that the aim of 
deception is to change the receiver’s behavior through 
implanting or enabling the target to generate a false 
belief, ensuring applicability to online and military 
environments. This definition of deception is a 
refinement of that of [48] who primarily focus on 
deception, but we incorporate cognition and behavior. 
[41] propose a theoretical holistic model of 
deception incorporating traditional and differential 
recall enhancement (DRE) [9] approaches to credibility 
assessment alongside multiple-cue and multiple-
sourcing approaches. A further consideration of the 
effects of culture, personality and individual 
differences, motive and mindset are discussed. 
Deception cannot be avoided; indeed deception will 
occur whenever and wherever adversaries are seeking 
an advantage [3, 51]. Deception should be anticipated 
as occurring across a range of environments and 
greater understanding of how deception emerges and is 
responded to in complex environments is required. In 
this article, holistic, online, and military approaches to 
deception are reviewed, before the validation of a 
holistic approach to deception through interviews with 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) including researchers 
and practitioners working in diverse fields of 
deception. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1. Holistic Approaches 
 
Holistic approaches to deception combine verbal 
and non-verbal cues [39, 45], and knowledge of 
background, personality, cognition, culture and 
environmental factors [31] to increase accuracy in 
detecting deception. As credibility assessment may be 
adversely affected in cognitively challenging and 
group decision-making environments [31] there is a 
need to implement a bespoke holistic approach to 
deception detection which incorporates an 
understanding of decision-making to counter potential 
vulnerabilities. 
[4] counter-deception approach examines 
‘intelligence functions’ including deception cues, 
deception detection and exposure, adversary discovery 
and penetration alongside ‘operational functions’ 
incorporating mitigation and exploitation of adversary 
deception. These functions are argued to be highly 
interdependent and present deception as a continuum 
of functions rather than individual elements [4]. 
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Human reasoning and self-assessment of own biases, 
beliefs and methods of intelligence gathering, and 
intelligence-gathering channels will identify potential 
vulnerabilities potentially mitigating the effects of 
deception [4]. Multiple channels of information enable 
a greater range of HUMINT with which to assess 
credibility [4]. Threat and situation assessments are 
required to understand the influences and 
circumstances in which deception may occur [4] and 
such approaches parallel more recent psychological 
approaches to understanding high-stakes future intent 
[19]. 
To increase accuracy in deception detection in 
complex operating environments, [41] propose using a 
combination of verbal, nonverbal and paralinguistic 
cues to deception alongside a consideration of 
personality and individual differences, motive, mindset 
and consideration of decision-making. Cues are argued 
to reflect context and may not be applicable across all 
instances of deception [2]. The multiple cue approach 
incorporates consideration of low-stakes [47], high 
stakes [39] and rapid judgement [47] environments and 
hence such evidence supports a holistic, tailored 
approach. [41] propose multiple-sourcing alongside 
multiple-cues whereby different sources of information 
can be examined for consistency increasing available 
knowledge for credibility judgements. The 
incorporation of the CHAMELEON Approach [18] 
(which focuses on targeting interviewing strategies 
according to context) into a holistic approach to 
deception by [41] highlights that individual’s behavior 
and the strategies they use to present themselves 
change across contexts. The impact of culture, 
religiosity and belief system on deception is 
incorporated into a holistic approach to deception [41]. 
 
2.2. Online Approaches 
 
Deception detection in online contexts may be 
challenging [17] and requires consideration of 
linguistic patterns [22], the use of ‘warrants’ 
(connections between online and real-world identities) 
to confirm a sender’s identity [50], ‘digital footprints’ 
and ‘scent trails’ to uncover malign intent [42], and 
adaptations of computer-mediated investigative 
interviewing approaches [9, 15, 29]. Regarding the 
influence of third party opinions, [36] examined the 
linguistic features of online reviews to identify truthful 
and deceptive opinions and found that truthful reviews 
contained more concrete and sensorial language and 
were more accurate about spatial information, whilst 
deceivers focused upon elements not directly related to 
the subject they were reviewing and, in contrast to 
previous research [35], used more positive language. 
This has implications for understanding the content of 
opinions and speeches posted in online environments, 
especially in higher stake situations where such views 
can sway public belief and behavior, for example, 
reviews may have a large impact on auction fraud, 
whilst deceptive opinions may affect support for on-
going regional conflicts. 
In the online environment the ability to alter 
identity benefits those who engage in malign acts, 
regardless of the deceptive nature of the behavior. The 
malign intent of a child sexual offender purporting to 
be a child while grooming a victim, or a sadistic stalker 
who presents in a chameleon manner provides a more 
concerning presentation of behavior and intent. This 
becomes further problematic when offending behavior 
is online and offline and individuals use aliases to 
reduce the likelihood of detection.  The use of 
‘warrants’ enable links to be examined between an 
individual’s real-world and online identities [50] and 
deception may occur more routinely in online chat 
environments that enable greater anonymity, and less 
often in the use of email where warrants are visible but 
can be modified to mislead. Although examining 
‘warrants’ may be a useful strategy for assessing 
credibility in low-stakes online interactions, in high-
stake interactions the levels of sophistication employed 
by groups and individuals to cover their identities and 
tracks are greater, as is the motivation, level of 
resources and ability to manipulate. 
Uncovering hidden deception and malign intent 
across interpersonal and online environments can 
include the identification of ‘digital footprints’, ‘digital 
exhaust’ or ‘scent trails’ that can be coupled with 
collateral evidence such as surveillance footage [14, 
42]. Although rarely the focus of traditional deception 
approaches, examining patterns of behavior, including 
email communications, online statements and online 
searches of information about potential targets [14] 
may enable the identification of concealed actions. In a 
holistic approach to deception, a proactive stance is 
required where potential adversaries are being 
monitored to ensure that information is collated and 
assessed for deceit. Furthermore, there is potential for 
collected evidence to be later used in investigative 
interviews with which to challenge suspect’s 
narratives. 
 
2.3. Military Approaches 
 
Approaches to detecting deception in the military 
environment have focused on analysis of competing 
hypotheses (ACH) [26, 43], the Busby-Whaley 
Ombudsmen technique, and a more holistic approach 
to counter-deception advocated by [4]. ACH consists 
of a series of steps firstly involving the identification of 
possible hypotheses, secondly listing evidence and 
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assumptions for and against each hypothesis, thirdly 
drawing tentative conclusions about the likelihood of 
each hypothesis, analysis of the sensitivity of the 
conclusion to significant evidence, and lastly the 
identification of future observations that would 
confirm or eliminate the hypotheses [43]. To counter 
confirmation biases and aid decision-making [26] 
recommends that there should be an increased 
emphasis on seeking refutations for hypotheses rather 
than confirmations.  ACH is a promising method of 
supporting decision-making processes involved in 
detecting deception, as there is the potential to 
incorporate a broader range of factors including human 
behavior, motivation, intent and mindset alongside 
evidence developed from HUMINT. 
[52] propose a theory of counter-deception based 
upon approaches applicable to multiple contexts. They 
identified nine categories of cues (pattern, players, 
intention, payoff, place, time, strength, style and 
channel) which are elements that the deceiver may 
conceal or reveal during deception [52]. The major 
principle of this approach is the ‘plus-minus rule’ 
where cues may indicate deception by their presence or 
absence and the ‘congruity-incongruity rule’ is 
suggested where deception may prove challenging to 
identify and requires further investigation [52]. 
Techniques include: ‘Locard’s exchange principle’ – 
where a deceiver may leave evidence at the scene and 
take some away; ‘verification’ – of the deception; ‘the 
law of multiple sensors’ – examination of multiple 
channels for deceit; ‘passive and active detection’ – the 
examination of current evidence and the search for 
further evidence; ‘pre-detection’ – where 
understanding an adversary’s deception modus 
operandi, goals and capabilities may uncover potential 
deception; ‘penetration and counterespionage’ – 
uncovering an adversary’s plans through espionage and 
neutralizing adversary operatives to protect target 
infrastructure; ‘the prepared mind and intuition’ – 
where preparation for deception and the intuition to 
detect it enables counter-deception; and ‘indirect 
thinking and the third option’ – the ability to detect 
potential adversary options for deception is required 
for counter-deception. [52] final element is the 
‘Ombudsman Method’ where irrelevances, 
discrepancies and misdirection are examined alongside 
indirect thinking and intuition [4]. This approach to 
deception detection appears promising where elements 
may be adopted towards a holistic approach 
particularly regarding using multiple sources of 
HUMINT, and active deception detection alongside 
alternative ways of considering threats. 
A bespoke, tailored approach to deception creates 
individual assessments of veracity across situations and 
ultimately meets the requirements of practitioners. The 
current research seeks to refine and expand the 
theoretical holistic approach to deception developed by 
[41] through interviews with SMEs in deception. In 
military environments there are limited opportunities 
for practitioners to develop skills necessary in 
countering adversary deception and in deceiving 
others; to overcome this limitation [52] propose an 
incorporation of knowledge from a wide range of areas 
to identify techniques used to uncover deception. 
Through adopting an in vivo approach to research and 
incorporating a wide range of SME knowledge a more 
robust approach to deception detection can be 
developed. 
 
3. Data Collection Method  
 
3.1. Participants 
 
An opportunistic, snowballing sample enabled the 
recruitment of 19 SMEs in deception. The sample 
comprised 14 (74%) males and 5 (26%) females, of 
which, 15 (79%) were European and 4 (21%) were 
North American. The average length of expertise 
within the SME cohort was 17.6 years (SD = 11.46) 
ranging from 5 to 42 years’ experience. Participants 
had expertise in both singular and multiple areas of 
deception. Overall participants had expertise in the 
following areas: interpersonal deception (N = 12), 
online deception (N = 6), military deception (N = 5), 
influence (N = 2) and personality (N = 4). 
 
3.2. Materials 
 
Interview schedules were developed for the 
interpersonal, online and military domains of deception 
and credibility assessment. Interview questions were 
designed to elicit SMEs knowledge of deception. 
Interview questions were focused around the 
environments in which deception occurs, strategies that 
deceivers use to convince others of their credibility, the 
potential impact of personality on deception, current 
strategies of deception detection and potential ways to 
improve them, parallels between the domains of 
deception, and the identification of potential future 
threats. A digital Dictaphone was used to record 
interviews which were stored securely on an Ironkey to 
ensure security and transcribed verbatim.  Hardcopies 
were additionally stored in a secure environment. 
 
3.3. Procedure 
 
Participants were identified as SMEs if they had 
academic or practitioner experience in deception. 
Participants were initially approached via email or 
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face-to-face contact and followed up by an email 
inviting them to participate in research seeking to 
develop a holistic model of deception. Of the 41 
individuals who were asked to participate in the 
research, 19 agreed. A general interview schedule was 
included as an email attachment to enable participants 
to examine the questions being asked of them, although 
interviews were further tailored to SMEs areas of 
expertise. Due to the nature of some of the work 
undertaken by SMEs approached, two different 
interview schedules were made available to 
participants, one interview schedule including 
interpersonal and online topics was provided to 
participants without appropriate security clearances 
and another interview schedule including interpersonal, 
online and military topics was provided to those 
participants with appropriate security clearances. Once 
participants had read through the information sheet and 
agreed to participate in the research, they were 
informed that their data would be anonymized and 
stored in a secure location, that they had a two-week 
window to withdraw their data if they so choose. 
Participants were then interviewed at a location of their 
choice and convenience. Following the interviews 
participants were debriefed about the aims of the 
research and thanked for their input. Ethical approval 
for this research was granted by the Ethics Committee 
of the School of Psychology of the University of 
Lincoln. 
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
 
Responses were transcribed verbatim and treated 
from a critical realist perspective [6] where responses 
were considered as reflecting reality whilst 
acknowledging they were generated as part of the 
interview procedure. An explanatory thematic analysis 
[21] at the semantic level was conducted according to 
the conventions outlined by [6]. First, familiarization 
with the data set occurred through transcription, and 
initial idea generation. Second, initial coding of 
relevant data was conducted. All codes were discussed  
with the research team and revised according to their 
input. Third, codes were gathered together into themes. 
Fourth, themes were reviewed against coded extracts 
and the entire data set. Fifth, clear naming and defining 
of themes was conducted, followed by the sixth stage, 
construction of the report. The explanatory thematic 
analysis resulted in the generation of 5 meta-themes 
across the process of deception. 
 
4. Analysis and Discussion 
 
4.1. Key Findings 
 
Analysis of SMEs responses led to the 
identification of 5 meta-themes related to the process 
of deception and its detection, including the meta-
themes of ‘Deceiver’, ‘Intent’, ‘Deception Tactics’, 
‘Interpretation’ and ‘Target’ (See Figure 1). These 
themes put forward a comprehensive view of deception 
from the deceiver actions, intentions, deception 
components, information interpretation, and target 
elements, including vulnerabilities.  
 
 
Figure 1: Holistic Model of Deception 
  The Holistic Model of Deception (HMD) 
integrates interpersonal deception theory (IDT) [7] and 
features-based models of credibility [12, 27, 30, 33, 
53]. The HMD proposes that the context will affect the 
form of interaction used, how the deceiver will behave 
in that interaction and the techniques that will be 
deployed to detect deception. Multiple interpretation 
techniques, where applicable, can be used 
simultaneously to detect deception building upon 
recommendations by [39] that multiple-cues to 
deception are used, multiple sources will also be used 
alongside an awareness of personality, individual 
differences, mindset and background history.  
[41] proposed a model of deception, which focused 
upon the elements of deception and provided a 
framework of individual differences that will affect the 
deceiver and the target. The HMD has built upon this 
model through the examination of diverse deception 
elements and individual differences across the 
deceiver, their intent, their strategy, ways of 
interpreting information and the target. Understanding 
the process of deception requires an iterative process 
where the HMD will be revised in future to reflect new 
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developments in understanding of the deceiver, their 
intent, deception tactics, strategies of interpreting 
information and assessing credibility and 
understandings of the target’s decision-making 
processes. The key findings of each theme are outlined 
below. 
 
4.2. Deceiver 
 
The first meta-theme identified from the dataset 
was ‘Deceiver’, this meta-theme incorporates sub-
themes related to ‘Stakes’, ‘Impression Management’, 
‘Motivation’, ‘Background History’, ‘Deceiver 
Vulnerabilities’, ‘Target Audience Analysis’, and 
‘Planning Spontaneity’. The themes examine factors 
influencing how the deceiver makes decisions 
regarding deception and their potential ability to appear 
credible whilst deceiving. High-stakes situations may 
prove more challenging to appear credible [46] than in 
low-stakes where deceit may have little consequence. 
High-stakes situations are argued to increase anxiety 
and cognitive load in some deceivers leading to the 
identification of cues to deceit [39]. In strategic 
environments deceivers may place more emphasis 
upon carefully designing deception plans to avoid 
highlighting cues to deceit. 
‘Impression Management’ examines the strategies, 
which the deceiver uses to appear credible to others 
across different environments. Previous research has 
focused upon how people manage their statements [24] 
and body language [28] and [18] proposed a series of 
distinct personality-based behaviors which are used to 
influence and persuade others of their credibility. 
Online approaches to impression management have 
focused upon the design features of websites and how 
people present themselves [47]. Incorporating 
‘Impression Management’ into a holistic model of 
deception will enable practitioners assessing veracity 
in security and intelligence settings to understand the 
ways in which people and information are constructed 
to appear credible according to context. 
The ‘Motivation’ of the deceiver will have an 
impact on how they deceive others and the deceiver’s 
motivation is closely linked to the ‘Stakes’ of the 
situation. In interpersonal deception, motivation has 
been found to impair deceiver’s ability to deceive 
others [11]. However, this may not occur in all 
circumstances, as individual differences will influence 
cognitive abilities during interviewing. In the online 
environment ‘Motivation’ has an enhancing effect on 
deception [23]. This would suggest that motivated 
deceivers would seek to influence others through 
online communication channels where there is an 
increased chance of success. ‘Motivation’ will affect 
how far the deceiver is willing to plan their deception 
and this may vary according to goals and the context in 
which to achieve these goals. 
‘Background History’ of the deceiver, including 
their personality, individual differences, their culture 
and language, and previous interactions with the target 
is required in a holistic model of deception as this will 
affect their interactions with the target and the 
strategies, they use to deceive them. This includes their 
mindset at the commencement of the deceit. 
Knowledge of an adversary’s background history, 
culture, individual differences and mindset factors [31, 
40] can increase our ability to accurately detect 
deception; the current research further incorporates 
knowledge of personality and its impact on deception, 
alongside knowledge of previous interactions with the 
adversary and what the outcomes were. An 
individual’s culture and language will present 
additional challenges to the target as this affects how 
they will view information presented by a deceiver 
from another culture [16]. In multicultural operating 
environments an awareness of the impact of culture is 
required to avoid decision-making errors. [18] 
highlight that individual’s background histories and 
previous experiences will affect how they will behave 
in future interactions, and these same principles can be 
applied to the holistic model of deception. 
‘Deceiver Vulnerabilities’ will affect how the 
deceiver will appear credible to others and open up 
pathways of detecting deception. The impact of 
emotional arousal, cognitive load and decision-making 
biases will adversely affect the deceiver’s ability to 
appear credible. The lack of emotions in some contexts 
adversely affects deceivers whereby they fail to present 
emotions that are expected, and that truth-tellers often 
experience [45]. Cognitive load adversely affects 
deceivers as it reduces capacity to present a credible 
argument [48]. These vulnerabilities in the deceiver 
can be exploited during the ‘Interpretation’ phase of 
the model and cues to deceit identified. 
When seeking to deceive others, ‘Target Audience 
Analysis’ is often conducted which will enable a 
deceiver to develop an enhanced understanding of the 
audience and identify key individuals and 
organizations to target. A deceiver’s ability to 
successfully conduct ‘Target Audience Analysis’ 
affects their ability to influence the target through 
whatever strategy has been selected for influence, and 
deceiver skill will play a role in how effective this is 
[32]. Although ‘Target Audience Analysis’ as a 
concept has emerged from strategic environments the 
idea of deceivers carefully selecting and exploiting the 
target can be seen in both interpersonal and online 
environments. The deceiver may carefully develop or 
spontaneously perform an act of deception to a specific 
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target and ‘Planning Spontaneity’ emerged as a sub-
theme in the data. 
Different levels of preparation are required for 
different situations where there is a need to appear 
credible. The level of planning that the deceiver puts 
into their deception will affect their ability to convince 
others that they are credible [44]. The current research 
highlights that poor planning can be identified or that 
deceiver’s strategies may subsequently collapse from 
challenges to their narrative. However, in long-term 
strategic deception, planning will play far great 
emphasis highlighting adversaries should be monitored 
and assessed for threat. 
 
4.3. Intent 
 
A need to understand the ‘Intent’ of the deceiver 
emerged from the data as a meta-theme, whereby 
understanding an individual’s motive and intent for 
engaging in deception will enable preparation for 
adversary deception to prevent vulnerabilities [19]. 
Differing intents to deceive whether to avoid being 
incarcerated for an act of criminality or to increase 
survival chances in a combat situation show a strong 
need to understand that deception occurs where there is 
intent. Past research has sought to uncover malign 
intent through questioning strategies [20]. However, it 
may be more pertinent to understand intent as part of a 
holistic approach to deception where the intent to 
deceive is regulated by adversary aims and motives 
and how situational elements will affect the timing of 
when deception occurs. This presents implications for 
how research into deception detection is conducted 
where participants are often automatically assigned to 
deception or truth-telling conditions excluding an 
individual’s intent to deceive in specific contexts. 
 
4.4. Deception Tactics 
 
The third meta-theme of ‘Deception Tactics’ 
emerged from the dataset where the role of context is 
highlighted and different tactics for controlling 
information, influencing and deceiving the target are 
outlined. Sub-themes related to ‘Deception Tactics’ 
include: ‘Context’, ‘Control of Information’, 
‘Influencers’, and ‘Replicating Genuine Behavior’. 
‘Context’ plays a large role in which tactic the 
deceiver will employ against the target, and how the 
situation, including communication channel, may 
change the form of interaction. Online communication 
has changed elements of the deception context, where 
there is a greater scale and reach of deceit and the 
potential for anonymity. In military deception it is 
argued that the same principles exist behind deception 
although contextual changes with the development of 
communication technologies have increased the range 
for deception. Previous research into deception has 
generally ignored the context of deception and how 
this impacts upon the target and whether cues to 
deception are generalizable across contexts. Research 
by [18] highlights understanding that people will 
behave according to the context they are in, this can 
further be expanded to how groups and organizations 
may seek to deceive others according to the situation. 
The holistic model of deception places a strong 
emphasis upon context and the situational factors that 
may lead to a deceiver choosing a specific tactic of 
deception. 
‘Control of Information’ enables the deceiver to 
control what information is portrayed to the target. 
Through increasing the amount of information, the 
target receives, the deceiver can increase target 
ambiguity and cognitive load as there will be more 
information to process reducing the target’s ability to 
respond to a situation. Through decreasing the amount 
of information, the target receives target ambiguity is 
also increased as the target will have less information 
with which to assess credibility. Deceivers often seek 
to control the way in which they present information 
whether verbal, non-verbal or physical to others and 
previous research has highlighted that deceivers may 
give shorter statements to their target to control their 
narrative and ensure consistency [25], but may also 
increase the number of individual details within their 
statement [34], potentially as a way of distracting the 
target from the deceptive content. Understanding how 
the deceiver may control information and the way in 
which they choose to release this information is 
required in detecting deception as this affects the 
strategy used to detect that deception. 
‘Influencers’ highlights the various strategies that 
individuals use to persuade the target of their 
credibility. There are many techniques that can be used 
to influence others in everyday interactions, whether 
deception is occurring or not. Research examining 
persuasion tactics has identified key areas for 
influencing others [8] which has been applied to real-
world activities, for example, advertising strategies. 
However, examining the impact of influence tactics in 
deception has been relatively neglected and the 
proposed model seeks to incorporate these. 
One technique of appearing credible to others is 
through ‘Replicating Genuine Behavior’, whether the 
perception of genuine behavior is based upon lay 
beliefs or upon actual understanding of how to 
replicate behavior an awareness of both will be 
required to understand how differing individuals and 
adversaries will behave. 
Replicating genuine behavior and appearance is a 
strategy that individuals seek to use in deceiving others 
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[24], however, this strategy may not always be 
effective as certain behaviors are harder to replicate in 
some contexts [39]. To date psychological research 
into exploring how deceivers replicate genuine 
behavior has mainly focused upon examples of 
deception in low-stakes environments where 
individuals may not have time to develop a plan for 
deception that often occurs in the strategic 
environment. Further understanding of the strategies 
that people use in high-stakes environments to appear 
genuine to others is required. 
 
4.5. Interpretation 
 
The fourth meta-theme of ‘Interpretation’ emerged 
from the dataset and lists the varying techniques and 
areas of focus which are used in deception detection 
across different communication mediums. Identified 
sub-themes for the ‘Interpretation’ enable an analysis 
of information: ‘Source Attributes’, 
‘Questioning/Interviewing Strategy’, ‘Detection 
Methods’, ‘Surveillance and ISTAR’, and ‘Risk’. The 
wide range of techniques uncovered for assessing 
veracity may also enable the development of bespoke 
strategies for detecting deception reflecting contexts in 
which deception occurs. ‘Source Attributes’ examines 
factors (consistency, plausibility, credibility and 
prominence) that enable a source, whether the source is 
an individual in a face-to-face setting or information in 
an online domain, to appear credible.  
Past research in interpersonal deception has 
examined credibility as separate elements [49] rather 
than seeking to combine them enabling more accurate 
judgement about information. Research examining the 
credibility of websites has taken a more holistic 
approach to examining the source for credibility [13]. 
However, offering clear guidance on factors that 
enable analysis of sources across different 
communication channels as outlined above is required. 
When interacting with potentially deceptive 
individuals in dyadic or triadic conversation 
‘Questioning/Interview Strategy’ plays an important 
role in the generation of information to examine for 
deception or identify discrepancies for further 
examination, although as a factor it may not be 
applicable to all contexts. The cognitive interview may 
be used for questioning deceivers through discussing 
their statements extensively before requiring the 
deceiver to agree to their statement even if this 
contrasts with external evidence. Questioning and 
interviewing of individuals has often generated 
information for further analysis and has the potential 
for usage in conjunction with some verbal methods of 
detecting deception. Its inclusion in a holistic model to 
deception is required for usage in when we are 
interacting with individuals in interpersonal 
environments [9, 48]. 
Established techniques for examining information 
and intelligence for credibility emerged from the data 
set and ‘Detection Methods’ provide a range of 
techniques to detect deception from psychological and 
military backgrounds. Techniques to detect deception 
include verbal, non-verbal, pictorial, 
neuropsychological, paralinguistic and techniques used 
by military and intelligence personnel. These 
techniques will be utilized as part of a toolbox 
approach where the techniques used will fit the 
requirements of the situation. Previous research has 
begun to explore the use of multiple techniques to 
detect deception [4] and has found higher accuracy 
levels in detecting deception [39]. 
To uncover intelligence for assessment 
‘Surveillance and ISTAR’ will enable the generation of 
information through varying surveillance techniques 
depending on the availability of channels for retrieving 
information and evidence. ISTAR techniques 
traditionally generate intelligence about an adversary 
which can then be used to inform decision-making, 
whilst approaches to deception detection have focused 
on identifying cues to deceit, though combining 
approaches verbal and non-verbal behavior can be 
analyzed alongside other intelligence, reflecting how 
deception is often detected in real-life [37]. 
In examining information for veracity there is 
always an element of ‘Risk to Analyst’ involved where 
incorrect decisions may have large consequences for 
organizations and an ability to examine risk is required. 
The impact of ‘Risk to Analyst’ on deception has been 
generally neglected within the deception literature with 
techniques focusing upon percentage of accuracy. 
However, in real-life situations relying upon 
probability may prove problematic, through adopting 
multiple approaches to deception detection adverse risk 
can be reduced. 
 
4.6. Target 
 
The final meta-theme of ‘Target’ emerged from the 
dataset which focuses upon the targets decision-
making abilities and the factors that may affect the 
ability to accurately detect deception. Identified sub-
themes that will affect the target are: ‘Decision 
Making’, ‘Stakes’, ‘Individual Differences’, 
‘Motivation’, and ‘Capabilities and Resources’. 
‘Decision Making’ and how we make sense of the 
world is key to effectively detecting deception and 
mitigating risk. However, decision-making biases and 
attribution errors that the deceiver exploits may 
adversely affect the ability to detect deception. 
Decision-making biases have partially explained the 
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reasons for poor accuracy in detecting deceit, and an 
awareness of these biases and the decision-making 
process and their impact on the ‘Interpretation’ process 
is recommended to reduce error in detecting deception. 
The ‘Stakes’ of a situation will affect the receiver 
and how they will judge a situation where potential 
deception may be occurring. The impact of stakes on 
the deceiver as this will affect their ability to appear 
credible and enhance the target’s ability to more 
accurately detect deception. In everyday acts of 
deception, the deceit is often of little consequence and 
are used to maintain social harmony [5] therefore the 
target of that deceit may be less likely to question a 
situation. In cases related to strategic interests then 
stakes and the consequences of a decision will have a 
larger impact on the target and how risk is assessed. 
A wide range of ‘Individual Differences’ affect our 
ability to accurately judge others including deception 
detection. Individuals with specific personality traits 
are better able to judge others personality, suggesting 
that individuals with such traits will best be placed to 
detect deception. Through understanding receiver 
individual differences [1] awareness of potential 
vulnerabilities and advantages emerges, and through 
understanding these vulnerabilities the risk of 
deception can be mitigated. 
The target’s ‘Motivation’ to detect deception will 
affect their ability to accurately detect deceit. Previous 
research has identified that motivated individuals are 
often less accurate in detecting deception [38], and this 
may occur where individuals rely upon lay strategies 
for detecting deception rather than cues identified by 
research. However, where individuals are motivated 
and have expertise in identifying genuine cues to 
deceit, motivation may have a reduced impact on 
decision-making errors. 
Through understanding what ‘Capabilities and 
Resources’ are available the target will be able to 
ensure that they can recover information across varying 
communication channels, and they will have sources of 
expertise with which to analyze received information.  
 
4.7. Limitations 
 
The current research sought to validate and refine 
the holistic model of deception proposed by [41] by 
incorporating SME knowledge from a range of 
research and practitioner backgrounds. Volunteer bias 
suggests that this sample may not be representative of 
all SMEs in the field of deception and related areas and 
the specificity of the sample is acknowledged. 
Difficulties were encountered in accessing participants 
from security and intelligence backgrounds due to 
security reasons; therefore, it is acknowledged that 
there may be other techniques for detecting deception 
in military environments that the research has not 
incorporated into the holistic approach to deception. 
Further research may seek to address this issue through 
securing access to an SME sample with military and 
intelligence backgrounds. 
 
4.8. Future Directions 
 
The current research validates and refines the 
model of deception proposed by [41]; however, 
although strategies used to detect deception proposed 
by this model are outlined by SMEs there is a 
requirement for empirical validation. Future research 
should seek to examine the applicability of the model 
to real-world deception challenges, with a specific 
focus towards the online environment as an emerging 
area of risk. ‘Red teaming’ presents an option where 
rigorous analyses of the HMD can occur in a simulated 
real-world environment [10]. 
The ’Deceiver’ meta-theme proposed by the current 
research states a strong requirement for cultural 
knowledge to understand an adversary and what may 
affect their attempts at deception and its detection. In 
addition, the focus on the mindset of individuals at any 
time when there is the need to identify future intent and 
incorporate an understanding of risk requires broader 
perspectives to be taken.  Developing knowledge of 
these strategies may mitigate risk of deception. 
However, there is a current lack of research into 
cultural variations in how people deceive and seek to 
deceive others, specifically in the online environment, 
which presents additional challenges in an increasingly 
globalized world where individuals from differing 
cultural background interact daily, therefore future 
research should seek to address these concerns. 
In assessing credibility there is always an element 
of risk involved in making decisions, especially in 
high-stakes environments where there may be large 
consequences for incorrect decisions. The current 
research has identified as sub-theme of ‘Risk’ in 
interpreting information that future research should 
examine in depth to acknowledge the element of risk 
involved in detecting deception and produce guidelines 
for reducing risk in high-stakes deceit. 
An example of how deception may be identified 
and responded to may be developed from this model. If 
the deceiver had identified deception, cyber-deception 
through the range of identification tactics and strategies 
outlined in this mode. If the deceiver has been 
identified from their scent-trail or through mistakes in 
their website credibility or discourse, then the receiver 
can identify these mistakes and exploit them. They 
may then deploy the range of deception tactics and 
strategies outlined in this model. For example, if the 
deceiver has attempted to gain information through 
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phishing attacks, but has been identified then the target 
may send them false information in order to mislead 
them about their objectives. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In seeking to develop a holistic model of deception, 
the model proposed by [41] has been partially 
validated and refined through a series of interviews 
conducted with SMEs across the field of deception and 
influence. The current findings expand upon previous 
research into deception through formulating deception 
as a process whereby the deceiver conducts deception 
to achieve an aim motivated by their goals and affected 
by their culture, personality and mindset.  The 
deceiver’s choice of tactics and strategies with which 
to deceive will be reflective of context, communication 
channels and resources available to them, whilst the 
target has many techniques with which to interpret 
information and assess credibility, and the target in 
turn will be affected by individual differences, 
available resources and decision-making ability. In 
conclusion, it is argued that taking a more holistic 
perspective to viewing deception is required to mitigate 
risk. 
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